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We propose an extended public goods interaction model to study the evolution of cooperation in
heterogeneous population. The investors are arranged on the well known scale-free type network,
the Baraba´si-Albert model. Each investor is supposed to preferentially distribute capital to pools
in its portfolio based on the knowledge of pool sizes. The extent that investors prefer larger pools is
determined by investment strategy denoted by a tunable parameter α, with larger α corresponding
to more preference to larger pools. As comparison, we also study this interaction model on square
lattice, and find that the heterogeneity contacts favors cooperation. Additionally, the influence of
local topology to the game dynamics under different α strategies are discussed. It is found that the
system with smaller α strategy can perform comparatively better than the larger α ones.
I. INTRODUCTION
The evolution of cooperation among unrelated individ-
uals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and
social sciences [1, 2, 3]. A number of mechanisms have
been suggested which are capable of supporting coopera-
tion in the absence of genetic relatedness. Most notably,
this includes repeated interactions and direct reciprocity
[4, 5], indirect reciprocity [6, 7, 8], punishment [9, 10],
spatially structured populations [3, 11, 12, 13, 14], or vol-
untary participation in social interactions [3, 14, 15, 16].
The public goods game (PGG), which attracted much
attention from economists, is a general paradigm to ex-
plain cooperative behavior through group interactions
[17]. In this game, the defectors who do not contribute,
but exploit the public goods, fare better than the co-
operators who pay the cost by contributing. Thus,
the defectors have a higher payoff. If more successful
states spread, cooperation will vanish from the popula-
tion, and the public goods along with it. By consid-
ering the fact that who-meets-whom is determined by
spatial relationships or underlying networks, Szabo´ and
Hauert et al. have recently studied evolutionary PGG
in spatially structured populations bound to regular lat-
tices [3, 14, 18] as well as the well-mixed population
[3, 16, 19, 20]. In these work, the effects of compul-
sory and voluntary interactions of agents are also dis-
cussed. Several factors such as the voluntary participa-
tion [18], and small density of population [20], which re-
sult in small size of interaction group, are found to be
capable of boosting cooperation.
However, it has been recognized that regular graphs
constitute rather unrealistic representations of real-world
network of contacts (NoCs), in which local connections
(spatial structure) coexist with long-range connections
(or shortcuts). Also, connections in real-world networks
are heterogeneous, in the sense that different individu-
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als have different numbers of neighbors with whom they
interact. Indeed, these features have been recently iden-
tified as characteristic of a plethora of natural, social and
technological networks [21, 22, 23], which often exhibit a
power-law dependence on their degree distributions. In
addition, it is well accepted that the heterogeneity of
network often plays crucial roles in determining the dy-
namics [24, 25, 31]. Therefore it is worth investigating
the public goods interactions on scale-free network.
In this paper, we propose an extended PGG model to
study the evolution of cooperation and investment be-
havior upon heterogenous networks. It is known that,
in order to reduce risk, investors may take a portfolio
consisting of wide variety of joint enterprise [26]. In the
viewpoint of investors, some enterprise may be more at-
tractive than others, i.e., there exists heterogeneity of
attractiveness. In our previous work, we have studied
the the effect of heterogeneous influences on the evo-
lution of cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma game
[27, 28, 29]. Here, in the framework of PGG, we will con-
sider the effect of heterogeneity of common pools (which
we call pools’ “attractiveness” A) on investors. In our
model, investors having public goods interactions occupy
the vertices of the underlying network, with the edges
denoting interactions between them. Investors are as-
sumed to be aware of the sizes of pools, based on which
pools’ attractiveness can be estimated. The attractive-
ness of one given pool also depends on the investment
strategy α of the system, which regulates the extent of
investors’ preference to large pools. It will be shown that,
compared with the homogeneous network, the heteroge-
neous graphs generated via the mechanisms of growth
and preferential attachment (PA) can distinctively favor
cooperation, where, in addition, smaller α strategy favors
cooperation more than larger α strategy.
II. OUR MODEL
Investors in our model are arranged on certain kind of
underlying network and interact only with their immedi-
ate neighbors. A given investor j acts as an organizer of
2the common pool j with size kj+1, where there occurs the
PGG involving j itself and its neighbor investors. Here,
kj is the degree of j. Meanwhile, investor j will partici-
pate in the kj + 1 pools which we named the ‘portfolio’
of j including kj pools organized by its neighbors, and
the one pool by itself. The common pool j accumulates
capital from all its participant investors, and then equally
shares the profit to them. We assume that investors have
the capacity for learning the sizes of pools in their own
portfolio, which enable them to discriminate pools by es-
timating the attractiveness quantitatively. The value of a
given pool i’s attractiveness to investors is Ai = (ki+1)α,
with the real number α denoting the investment strategy
of the system, which regulates the extent of investors’
preference to larger pools. We can see that, the larger
the α is, the more attractive the large pools will be. The
total amount of capital distributed by a cooperator (state
s = 1) is normalized to unity, while that of a defector
(state s = 0) is zero, which implies that defector with-
hold its investment to free ride the other investor’s con-
tributions. Investors’ capital will be distributed to pools
proportional to the attractiveness. Thus, the amount of
capital investor j distributes to one of its pool i at time
t is,
Dji(t) =
Ai · sj(t)∑
l∈N (j)Al
, (1)
where N (x) is the community composed of the nearest
neighbors of x and itself, and sj(t) is the state of investor
j at time t. Investors will equally distribute their capital
into pools in portfolio when α = 0. They invest large
fraction of capital into larger pools for the case of α > 0,
or into smaller pools for the case of α < 0. If investor j is
a defector [sj(t) = 0], it distributes nothing to its pools,
and thereby Dji(t) = 0.
Then, the amount of capital the pool i accumulates at
time t can be written as,
Ci(t) =
∑
j∈N (i)
Dji(t) =
∑
j∈N (i)
Ai · sj(t)∑
l∈N (j)Al
(2)
We can express Eq. (2) in terms of the following matrix
equation,
~C(t) = A~S(t) :=


a11 . . . a1n
a21 . . . a2n
. . . . . . . . . . . .
an1 . . . ann

 ·


s1(t)
s2(t)
. . .
sn(t)

 (3)
where the elements of the matrix A are given by,
aij =


Ai/
∑
l∈N (j)
Al j ∈ N (i)
0 otherwise
. (4)
After the foresaid investing period, the total amount
in the pools multiples by a constant factor r, namely, the
interest rate on the common pools. For simplification,
FIG. 1: Average frequencies of cooperators and defectors as a
function of interest rate r (a), and typical snapshot of the 30×
30 square lattice with r = 3.8 (b). Black refers to cooperators,
and white to defectors. The results in (a) are averaged over
40 realizations. The rC (rD) indicates the value of r where
cooperators (defectors) vanish.
we assume that the profit of each common pool is then
equally shared to all participants irrespective of their in-
dividual contribution. Thus the aggregate payoff of agent
i after one generation is,
Pi(t) =
∑
j∈N (i)
r · Cj(t)
kj + 1
(5)
It can be written as ~P (t) = rBA~S(t), where the n × n
matrix B has element bij as,
bij =
{
1/(kj + 1) j ∈ N (i)
0 otherwise
. (6)
Taking into account the unity capital initially distributed
by cooperator, the total returns of investors can be writ-
ten as ~R = ~P − ~S.
The return ~R obtained in PGG interactions denotes
the reproductive success, i.e., the probability that one
neighbor will adopt the agent’s state. In order to max-
imize total returns, investors update their states after
each round of game according to the following rule: In-
vestor i selects one of its neighbor investor j with equal
probability. Given the total returns (Ri and Rj) from the
previous round, i adopts neighbor j’s state with proba-
bility [12, 14]:
W [sj → si] =
1
1 + exp[(Ri −Rj + τ)/κ]
(7)
where τ > 0 denotes the cost of state change, and κ
characterizes the noise introduced to permit irrational
choices. For κ = 0 the neighboring state sj is adopted
deterministically provided the payoff difference exceeds
the cost of state change, i.e., Rj − Ri > τ . For κ > 0,
states performing worse are also adopted with a certain
probability, e.g., due to imperfect information. Following
the previous work [14], we simply fix the value of κ to be
0.1.
3III. SIMULATION RESULTS
First, we briefly consider the extended PGG dynamics
upon square lattice with periodic boundary conditions,
where the strategy α does not affect the capital distribu-
tion because of the degree homogeneity. The dynamics
starts from the random arrangement of investors’ states
either as cooperators or defectors. In Fig. 1(a), we show
the average equilibrium frequencies of cooperators and
defectors as a function of interest rate r. It is expectable
that, the curve shows a growth in the frequency of coop-
erators with increasing values of r. Below the threshold
value r < rC cooperators quickly vanish, whereas for high
r > rD defectors go extinct. For intermediate r the two
states coexist in dynamical equilibrium. The subscript
S of rS refers to the vanishing state. Just as was found
in Refs. [11, 12, 14], the snapshot of the dynamics (Fig.
1(b)) shows that cooperators persist by forming clusters
and thereby minimizing exploitation by defectors.
Let us now consider the evolutionary dynamics of PGG
upon the Baraba´si-Albert (BA) model [22, 23]. It means
that different investors in this system will have portfo-
lios consisting of different number of pools. Also, some
pools may absorb capital from many investors, whereas
other pools may absorb from much less investors. In ad-
dition, the size of pools exhibits a scale-free distribution
as the degree of the underlying network, which result in
very different values of attractiveness. Here, we want
to point out that, although larger pools have more in-
vestors, whether they can accumulate more capital than
the smaller pools still depends on the investment strat-
egy, preferring the smaller pools (α < 0), the larger pools
(α > 0), or equally distributing investment (α = 0).
Numerical simulations are performed in a system of
N = 4000 investors located on a BA network with av-
erage connectivity fixed as 4 which is the same as the
square lattice. That is, the network grows from a com-
pletely connected network with m0 = 5 vertices, and at
every time step a new vertex with m = 2 edges is added
(the construction of the BA network can refer to Refs.
[22, 23]). Fig. 2 shows the average equilibrium frequen-
cies of cooperators with different α strategies on BA net-
works. One can notice that, no matter what the strategy
α is, the qualitative feature of frequencies of states remain
unchanged for the BA network. Again three domains are
observed: defectors dominate for low r < rC , co-existence
for intermediate values of r and homogenous cooperation
for high r > rD. However, we find that the heterogeneous
structure distinctly favors cooperators, because the rD
(where defectors vanish) for the BA networks are much
smaller than that for lattice (see Fig. 1). Furthermore,
we notice that the system with smaller α strategy would
behave better than that with larger α, which implies that
cooperation are rendered more attractive when investors
prefer smaller pools rather than larger ones.
FIG. 2: Average frequency of cooperators as a function of
interest rate r with investment strategy α = −2, −1, 0, and
1, respectively. Parameters: τ = 0.1 and κ = 0.1.
IV. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSIONS
We can understand the above-mentioned simulation re-
sults by the following analysis. From individual perspec-
tive, the unit investment contributed by one cooperator
i will be returned to the system as r payoff after each
round of game. The amount of payoff returned to i itself
can be written as,
Pii =
∑
j
r ·Dij(t)
kj + 1
= r ·
∑
j [1/(kj + 1)] · Aj · si(t)∑
j Aj
(8)
≡ r · si(t) · Lα. (9)
Here, j ∈ N (i), and Lα denotes the weighted average of
1/(1 + kj) with Aj as weight factor. Thus, how much
one cooperator can benefit itself from its own unity in-
vestment depends on interest rate r, investment strategy
α, as well as its local topology including the degrees of
its own and its neighbors. For a given investor, the temp-
tation to defect can be measured in terms of 1.0 − Pii,
which is actually independent of other investors’ states.
Note that for r > 1/Lα the social dilemma raised by the
PGG is relaxed in the sense that each unity investment
has a positive net return, and therefore investor can pay
off better when adopting cooperation rather than defec-
tion. Here, 1/Lα in our extended PGG model in fact
corresponds to the group size in the original PGG model
[3]. For the networks with homogeneous degree k, 1/Lα
returns to k+ 1 as the value of group size, while for het-
erogeneous network, the values of 1/Lα are various for
different investors. We give the illustration of Pii on BA
network in the case that all investors adopt cooperation
(~S = 1). The interest rate r is set as 1.0 so that Lα = Pii.
In Fig. 3, we show Pii of investors as a function of
their degreeKi, with investment strategy α = −2 (a) and
4FIG. 3: The Pii of investors as a function of their degree ki
(square), and the average Pii over investors with given degree
(dot) with α = −2 (a), and α = 1 (b), respectively. The
network is a BA model with N = 105 and m = 2.
α = 1 (b). It is noteworthy in the figures that investors
with the same degree may have wide range of Pii, which
reveals the great diversity of agents’ individual local con-
nection. One can notice from the average values with
α = −2 that the Pii of investors with large degree and
smallest degree (k = 2) is similar, while that of the in-
termediate degree investor, especially the k = 3 investor,
is comparatively small. It is known for BA model that,
those agents with degree k = m are latterly added follow-
ing degree-PA mechanism, and thereby more probably to
have large degree neighbors. When investor prefers small
pools (α < 0) the investor i with degree k = 2 would dis-
tribute most of its investment to pool i, and then gain
1/3 of the profit, with the largest amount approximately
equal 1/3 [see Fig. 3(a)]. In contrast, agents with k = 3
still have a neighbor which is younger than them, thus
more likely to be of small degree. The investor j with
k = 3 will distribute part of its capital c (the amount
between 0.0 and 1.0) to its own pool j and then gain c/4,
with the remained capital gain less than (1− c)/3 profit.
Therefore, generally speaking, the Pii of k = 3 investor is
smaller than that of k = 2 investor. In the inset of Fig.
3(a), we plot the relations of each k = 3 investors’ Pii
with its 3 neighbors’ degree k′. One can notice that, for
the intermediate degree investors, the separated range
of Pii [see Fig. 3(a)] is closely related to the k
′ = m
neighbor. Those investors with neighbors’ minimum de-
gree k′min = 2 would have larger Pii, while those with
k′min ≥ 3 are comparatively small (Pii < 1/4). In addi-
tion, the large degree investors almost deterministically
have k′min = 2 neighbor pools, which pay them off with
more profit than the large pools. Thus the corresponding
ranges of Pii are not separated, and the average values
are around 0.3 for large degree investors. In addition,
when α = 1 [see Fig. 3(b)], investors are likely to dis-
tribute most capital into large pools. The decrease of
the average Pii with agent’s degree can be attributed to
investor’s increasing number of large pools, which shares
the profit to more (other) investors rather than return-
ing to i itself. From the former analysis, one gets that
local topology of networks has significant impact on PGG
FIG. 4: (a) Average Pii over given degree investors under
different investment strategies. The strategies from top to
bottom respectively are α = −2, −1, 0, and 1. And (b)
the corresponding probability distribution of Pii. The inter-
est rate r is set as 1.0. (c) The fraction of investors whose
Pii are larger than 1.0 with the increasing r. (d) The ef-
fective group size 〈1/Lα〉 of network (circle) under different
investment strategies α, compared with that of square lattice
(square). The network is a BA model with N = 105 and
m = 2.
dynamical process.
In Fig. 4(a), with respect to the dash line Pii = 0.2
which denotes the case of square lattice, we show the
average values of Pii over investors of given degree with
investment strategies α = −2, −1, 0, and 1. The corre-
sponding probability distributions of Pii are also given in
Fig. 4(b). The smaller α strategies are found to result
in comparatively larger values of Pii. This can be easily
understood from the form of Eq. (9) [30]. The fraction of
investors who have Pii > 1.0, with the increasing of rate
r are also plotted in Fig. 4(c). We see that, in the sys-
tem with smaller α strategy, more agents are better off
cooperating than defecting for certain interest rate r, no
matter what their neighbor investors do. Furthermore,
we can improve our understanding from the perspective
of so-called “effective group size” 〈1/Lα〉, which denotes
the average impact of agent’s local topology to the game
dynamics under certain investment strategy. The effec-
tive group size 〈1/Lα〉 of BA model with m = 2 (circle)
as a function of strategy α are shown in Fig. 4(d). In the
reign of α < 0, the 〈1/Lα〉 of BA model is smaller than
the group size of the square lattice (square), while in the
reign of α > 0 the 〈1/Lα〉 becomes larger. In this point of
view, our result is coincide with that of the former works
[3, 14, 16, 18, 19, 20], i.e., smaller group of player favor
cooperators in the PGG.
From the illustration of ~S = 1 case, we know that,
agents’ temptation to defect are different because of their
different local topologies. Furthermore, the system with
5FIG. 5: (a) Distributions of states in BA network. Coopera-
tors are denoted by red bars, while defectors by white bars,
the lengthes of which are proportional to the relative percent-
age of the respective state for each degree k. (b) Each agent’s
frequency of state updating (open square) during the evolu-
tion of the system from the initial random state to the final
equilibrium state within 25000 generations. And the averages
over agents with the same degree (dot). The simulation takes
place on the BA network of size N = 1000 and m = 2, with
interest rate r = 1.6, strategy α = 0, which result in the
frequency of cooperators ρC = 0.684.
smaller α strategy may render cooperation more attrac-
tive for the reason that cooperator investors can benefit
themselves more than those in systems of larger α, which
therefore relaxes the social dilemma better.
Similar to the former studies of other games [31, 32,
33], the heterogeneity intrinsic to SF NoCs also con-
tributes to the enhancement of cooperation, by favoring
cooperators to occupy the large degree agents so as to
outperform defectors. The detailed description of the oc-
cupation of vertices with given degree is shown in Fig.
5(a). One can clearly find that, almost all hubs are oc-
cupied by cooperators, whereas defectors present merely
at low degree vertices. In Fig. 5(b), we plot the state
updating frequency of each agent during the evolution of
the system from the initial state to the final equilibrium
state. From the figures, we know that with respect to
the small degree agents, the hubs always behave as co-
operator and rarely change. During the evolution, when
a hub is a defector investor, it can exploit and may eas-
ily invade most of its cooperator neighbors. However,
in doing so, the number of neighbor cooperators will de-
crease in subsequent rounds, which in turn acts to re-
duce the total returns of such defector hub. Whenever
its return becomes comparable to that of a cooperator
neighbor, invasion may occur. On the contrary, however,
once cooperators invade hubs, they will tend to increase
the fraction of cooperator neighbors, in turn maximizing
their own returns. In other words, once invading a hub, a
cooperator becomes so successful that it is very difficult
for defectors to ‘trike back’, as evidenced by the results
shown in Fig. 5.
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, considering the heterogeneity of real-
world NoCs, we have proposed an extended public goods
interaction model in this paper. The investor bounded
to the underlying network will distribute capital to pools
proportionally to their attractiveness, which reflects the
heterogeneous influence of pools on investors, with the
investment strategy α regulating the value of attractive-
ness. From the comparative studies of the game dy-
namics upon square lattice and BA scale-free network,
we found that heterogeneous structured population par-
tially resolves the dilemma and improves social welfare.
On one hand, the hub cooperators always remain stable,
and spread cooperation to a larger fraction of the agents.
On the other hand, cooperator investors can pay them-
selves off with more profit when taking small α invest-
ment strategy, which relaxes the social dilemma further
and enhances the reproductive success of cooperation.
In addition, the qualitative features of the game
dynamics sustain when the network size N and the
parameterm of BA networks are different. The networks
with smaller m are proved to favor cooperation more,
which can be attributed to the corresponding smaller
group size [16, 18].
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